

| ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET | | | | |
|--|----------|------------------|--------------------------|---|
| SUBJECT: (Optional) Proposal for a Senior Seminar | | | | |
| FROM: DTR 819, 1000 Glebe | | EXTENSION NO. | DATE 16 November 1970 | |
| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) | DATE | | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) |
| | RECEIVED | FORWARDED | | |
| 1. A-DD/S | | | | Attached copies for distribution to the Deputy Directors if you so desire. |
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| 3. Ex Dir-Compt | | | | |
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FILE

Training 3

18 NOV 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel White

Attached is the paper which you advised the Deputies at the meeting of 28 October would be produced by Hugh Cunningham. I presume that you will wish to distribute copies to the Deputies, the General Counsel and Inspector General so that the subject can be put on a future Deputies' Meeting agenda.

The study mentioned in paragraph (1) was done internally in the Office of Training by a senior group It did not result in any paper.

I checked Hugh Cunningham on the question of resources to be used. He confirmed that his present ideas contemplate using existing staff and facilities but that there might ultimately be a requirement for additional dollars for the reimbursement of outside speakers.

(signed) John W. Coffey

John W. Coffey

Att: Memo dtd 16 Nov 70 for ExDir-Compt
fr DTR, subj: Proposal for a Senior
Seminar -- DD/S 70-4529

A-DD/S:JWC:maq (18 Nov 70)

Distribution:

Orig - ExDir w/O & 6 ccys DD/S 70-4529

1 - DD/S Subject w/ccy DD/S 70-4529 ✓

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

16 November 1970

NOTE FOR: Mr. Coffey

The attached proposes to Colonel White the creation of a Senior Intelligence Seminar to offer a program for senior officers somewhat equivalent to existing programs for junior and mid-career officers.

Comments:

a. It doesn't tell Colonel White what we want him to do with it.

b. There is no indication of resource implications--can we do it with present staff--para 5 says OTR can present course in fall of 1971 "with the necessary support from the rest of the Agency." 3f says speaking for senior officers could be offset by passing current obligations along to subordinates.

c. How long before we run out of audience? Nominations for this year's Senior Schools numbered 58 for 26 positions. May be many others who were screened out by nominating officials. Also suggests in para 5 that the course be opened to the rest of the Community after it has gone through some seasoning.

d. Para 1 refers vaguely to "a study recently undertaken in OTR"--nothing to establish its credibility--better to eliminate para 1 and let para 2 be opening gambit.

e. Para 3d alludes to "Agency success with Problem Solving Seminars." These were DD/S sponsored. Will this reference mean anything to Colonel White and others?

I tried to reach Mr. [redacted]-who handcarried this in to Ellen, hoping to discuss with [redacted]-but he hadn't returned my call by 4 p.m.

RHW
es

Note: I'm holding all other cys of DD/S 70-4529.

p.

16 November 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

THROUGH

syue
: Deputy Director for Support 18 NOV 1970

SUBJECT

: Proposal for a Senior Seminar

1. A study recently undertaken in the Office of Training points to a need for a seminar for senior officers of this Agency - GS-15 and higher. I urge that consideration be given now to its establishment.

2. Much attention has been given to improving and broadening Agency training for junior and midcareer officers, with the general objectives of deepening their understanding of the intelligence profession as it operates in a world of growing complexity, and, in the Midcareer Course, helping to prepare them for higher responsibilities. These objectives deserve at least equal emphasis at the senior officer level. It should now be our aim to provide senior officers with the time and resources to review the status of the intelligence profession; to comprehend developing trends and necessities of which they may be only partially aware; to hear and discuss the most profound judgments available concerning foreign and domestic affairs, the relationships between them, and the potential impact of events upon intelligence as a major function of government. Most of all, we should provide those officers who are in the line of succession to senior managerial positions with an opportunity to address themselves in the most sophisticated fashion to the organizational and management problems which they will be inheriting.

3. Some of the factors underlying this recommendation are these:

a. That senior officers are interested in training opportunities for themselves is indicated by the number of competitors the Training Selection Board had to consider this year for the senior war colleges,

the Senior Seminar of the Foreign Service, the Federal Executive Institute, the Harvard Business School, etc. I do not know how many applied, but their superiors nominated 58 of them for 26 places - more than twice as many as could be accepted, though all 58 were qualified for special recognition. This disparity is likely to grow. It is also notable that several of these courses last up to a year, so it is clear that senior officers can be spared for advanced training.

b. There is certainly a market for the kind of training mentioned in paragraph 2 above. The best single evidence is the Advanced Intelligence Seminar, whose three successful runnings so far have all been oversubscribed and have been repeatedly described in student critiques as "the best course I've ever had." Excellent outside speakers, student interest in domestic problems and the future, and free exchange of views among representatives of the four directorates have all encouraged us to develop further training along these lines. But that Seminar lasts only two weeks and the average grade of the students has been GS-14. Similar changes have also been welcomed in the Midcareer Course, the COS Seminar, and elsewhere, but we are not yet reaching the near-future managers of the Agency. The effort to reach them in the Midcareer Course has led to such a concentration of students in their middle and late 40's that I am recommending that the course be restricted (with few exceptions) to men and women in their 30's, and that older officers be entered in other courses including the one I am proposing here.

c. Meanwhile the kind of senior training in intelligence I propose is not available anywhere else. The senior war colleges and the Foreign Service's Senior Seminar give only the most peripheral attention to U.S. intelligence. The Federal Executive Institute is of necessity aimed primarily at personal growth and renewal, and cannot concentrate on the problems of a particular activity within government. Outside management courses have to generalize the problems of American business. All these are recognized as valuable experiences for the few senior CIA officers who can share them, but it ought to be possible to combine their best attributes of broad scope, depth of attention, sabbatical refreshment, and (not least) prestige into a course that focuses on CIA and its leadership of U.S. intelligence.

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d. The Agency's fair success with problem-solving seminars suggests that the course I propose could serve that purpose as well. For example, the first running could have as its unifying theme a study and revision of that look at CIA's future which Lyman Kirkpatrick's task force wrote in 1965. How much have times changed since 1965, and why, and what further changes are in prospect? ,

e. A properly developed, rational program of career development training requires the establishment of this final, most sophisticated segment. This remains especially true so long as scores of senior CIA officers have had little or no training or experience in any intelligence function outside their own immediate jobs, and have only hazy or outdated notions of the work performed in other directorates and offices. Even those who have had the Midcareer Course (probably a number of years ago, if they are now in line of succession to top jobs) would benefit from a new and deeper look; they would be sharing their greater experience with a small number of other comers more usefully than was possible at midcareer.

f. The burden which training puts upon the topmost officers of the Agency is heavy, but I believe that much of it could most appropriately be devoted to those in the line of succession, while some of their customary appearances before more junior audiences could be handled by subordinates. One somewhat invidious reason for the prestige of the Midcareer Course is that in many cases the midcareerists have had more, or more recent, exposure to the top of the Agency than their own superiors have had. A senior course ought to strengthen the connection between the top men and their eventual successors, not just in their own directorates but throughout the Agency.

g. Finally, I am convinced we must devote more attention to the growing complexity and accelerated change in our situation both at home and abroad, and especially to their implications for the intelligence profession and the function of CIA. We should act on the suggestions made by [redacted]

[redacted] one of which was for an OTR seminar on the future.

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4. Here, then, is what I propose: a seminar of three months' duration conducted twice a year, each for twenty officers of minimum grade GS-15. It would include a wide variety of speakers, the best we could find both inside and outside the Agency, but would also seek considerable variety of reading, some writing, much discussion, films, debates, student presentations, roundtables, and perhaps some domestic travel patterned after that of the Midcareer Course and the DD/S&T training program. Some of it would be fairly free-swinging, but the structured blocs would include the following:

a. CIA

Its relationship as an agency to the White House, Congress, and American society, plus its internal developments, prospects, and problems. For example, how have the successive Presidents, their advisers on foreign affairs, and the DCIs influenced its development?

b. Management/Planning

Something of the personal approach of the Federal Executive Institute; something from one of the good management programs that could supplement the Grid or planning courses the students may already have had; possibly an updated Brookings week of the kind that used to be included in the Midcareer Course. This segment would be tailored as closely as possible to CIA problems, not to management in the abstract.

c. The National Security Machinery

How the NSC and the special committees and groups work, now and prospectively; their impact on CIA and vice versa.

d. The Intelligence Community

A frank review of relations and problems, the impact of various types of collection and analysis upon one another, requirements, jurisdictions, responsibilities, successes and failures.

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e. The U.S. Domestic Scene

Aimed not only at the concerned citizen but especially at the professional intelligence officer who must be attuned to the relationship between domestic and national security affairs, and sensitive to the ways in which they coincide or conflict.

f. The U.S. and the World of the 1970s

The most penetrating assessment of future foreign relations and problems the guest speakers and student body can come up with. We would hope for some publishable writing.

g. The Impact of Science and Technology

A broad consideration of the societal consequences of technological developments, narrowing down to their profound consequences for intelligence.

h. Strategic Military Equations

A view or series of views by experts on nuclear relationships, SALT, deterrence, the role of war in modern society, the problems of military estimates.

5. That will do for openers, and I believe that with the necessary support from the rest of the Agency OTR can present such a course in the Fall of 1971. But once such a course is successfully under way I believe we ought to consider and plan for a second stage: turning the course into a National Senior Intelligence Seminar open to the upper levels of the whole intelligence community. It could become an important vehicle for CIA's exercise of leadership and influence over the whole intelligence process. For the senior officers who took it, it could come to have as great educational value and prestige as they now get from any other senior course in the government. We could plan for a course

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completely open to the community or alternatively for one part open and a later part reserved to CIA.



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HUGH T. CUNNINGHAM
Director of Training

2 November 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director - Comptroller

SUBJECT : Proposal for a Senior Seminar

Fall of 1971

1. The results of a study which we have recently undertaken in the Office of Training -- combined with a suggestion from the Director of Personnel, 16 September, urge the establishment of a seminar for senior officers (15/16) of this Agency. I recommend that priority consideration be given now to its development. There appear to be some compelling reasons at this time why such a step should be taken. Much emphasis has been given to improving and broadening Agency training for junior and mid-career officers -- with the general objective of deepening their understanding of the intelligence profession as it operates in a world of growing complexity. This objective is deserving of at least equal emphasis at the senior officer level. The needs of their own personal development combined with the urgency of maintaining Agency professionalism suggest the existence of a major requirement for such a program. The objectives would be to provide these officers with the opportunity and resources to review the status of the intelligence profession, to comprehend developing trends in the profession about which they may be only dimly aware, and to re-evaluate and sharpen their own skills. An additional objective would be to provide these officers with the most profound judgments available concerning domestic and foreign affairs, the relationships between them, and the potential impact of these events upon intelligence as a major function of government. A complementary objective would be the ultimate establishment of a national intelligence seminar at this senior level -- open to

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State and DOD -- which would represent an additional means through which CIA could exercise leadership and exert influence in the intelligence community.

2. The following additional considerations underlie my recommendation:

a. There is no appropriate program currently existing which provides senior intelligence officers with an opportunity to review their own profession and to re-evaluate or hone their own professional skills. Many other agencies concerned with National Security affairs have such programs and the Civil Service Commission recently established the Federal Executive Institute to fill this need on behalf of old-line domestic agencies. In CIA the Advanced Intelligence Seminar (average grade about 14) and the COS Seminar represent the nearest approximation to a "senior" course. The COS Seminar is, of course, specialized for the CS, and the AIS, while increasingly sophisticated and relevant, does not provide the depth of study visualized for a truly "senior" program (it is particularly limited by the two-week time factor).

b. The non-Agency senior courses to which Agency officers are posted (war colleges, State Senior Seminar, FEI, management programs) do not consider the intelligence profession. Critiques from our students indicate that they are important as representational assignments, and there is much substance to be gained. But, the war colleges deal with subjects which are essentially familiar to a senior intelligence officer (however new they

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might be to a pilot or a destroyer captain), and the FEI (a valuable experience) is aimed primarily at personal growth and renewal -- the achievement of managerial balance and health. This is dictated by the enormous variety of agencies represented in a class. FEI simply could not concentrate on the problems of a particular activity within government.

Beyond this, the number of available spaces for CIA officers in the senior schools is not sufficient to provide training for all of those deserving this kind of opportunity. This suggests the existence of a serious long-term gap -- or void -- in the professional development of many of our most promising officers. Many will have had only an orientation program (some have not had that much) and perhaps a special course or two (Grid or Management). This suggests the need for a senior program -- not to replace the others, but rather to provide opportunity for an additional number of officers (40 a year would about double our current opportunity level).

c. The DIS National Senior Intelligence Course is, in fact, neither national nor senior. CIA has not found it particularly stimulating -- although it does provide our officers who attend with an appreciation of the vastness and complexity of the DOD intelligence effort. It would not represent what one would have in mind for a truly senior course.

d. There continues to be a judgement on the part of some top officials in CIA that parochialism inhibits our activities -- particularly among senior officers. While not a cure-all, a

carefully tailored senior program might well contribute to a diminution of this problem.

e. The world--domestic and foreign--continues to grow in complexity. The relation between domestic and foreign affairs is inevitably moving closer. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] He states that, "more discussion, more thought, more analysis, more attention to the problem of understanding the process of change and their implications for intelligence cannot but be desirable for an Agency whose purpose in being is to tell the US Government not just what has happened and is happening, but what is likely to happen." Mr. [REDACTED] suggests an OTR seminar on the future. The future -- and the art of futurology -- would obviously be a vital part of this proposed program.

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3. For the reasons cited in paragraphs 1 and 2, I recommend that a target date of fall, 1971, be set for the establishment of a senior seminar on intelligence -- of approximately three months duration -- to be conducted twice yearly -- and to include twenty CIA officers per seminar. I also recommend the planning of alternative programs which would allow for the following possibilities: a seminar including CIA, State, and DOD officers for the entire three-month period; a seminar including CIA, State, and DOD for the first two months, but limited to CIA for the final month.

4. I recommend that, generally, the following blocs of substance be included:

a. The US Domestic Scene

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In many respects more important for this level officer than for the juniors. Would be aimed not merely at the "concerned citizen," but at the intelligence professional who must now be more attuned to the relation between domestic and "national security" affairs, and sensitive to the points at which they coincide. This section should include not only an analysis of the disruptions and cleavages in US society, but how these factors relate to developments in US foreign policy and to evaluations of the US by other nations. Should include congressional views of foreign policy and impact thereupon, plus views of influential newspapermen and academicians (in addition, how do these people see CIA fitting into US society of the 70s). On the other hand -- a critique of Congress, the fourth estate, and the role of academics would be useful. We might even go so far as to discuss the state of literary and performing arts in the US. (2 weeks)

b. The US and the World

This would include sophisticated discussions of the key geographic areas (with emphasis on varying or conflicting interpretations of developments in those areas) and US relations and problems therein. This would be standard. However, we would add studies of particular and grinding policy problems ("the cold war" -- "the loss of China" -- "US failures in Latin America" -- "the US as the world's gendarme," etc.) (2 weeks)

c. The National Security Machinery

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Briefly -- what is it, but beyond that -- is it creaking?
The NSC, the special committees, etc. Proposals for change.
(1 week)

d. The Intelligence Community and Its Relation to National
Security Machinery

It's hard to see new subjects here, but they would be dealt
with, in a highly sophisticated and frank atmosphere. USIB and
its committees, INR under Cline, intelligence and military planning,
duplication and competition, etc. (1 week)

e. CIA

Its relationship as an agency to White House, to Congress,
in US society, plus its internal developments, prospects, and
problems. For example, what is the impact on CIA of the personality
of a particular DCI?

5. Supplementing the instruction considered in paragraph 4 the
following blocs would be added:

a. The Impact of Science and Technology

This would involve a broad consideration of the societal
consequences of technological developments -- narrowing down to
its profound consequences for intelligence. Perhaps a field
trip patterned upon the DDS&T training program.

b. Strategic Military Equations

A view (or a series of views) by the "experts" on nuclear
relationships and the role of war in modern society. Perhaps
a field trip patterned upon Mid-Career course.

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c. Management/Planning

There are numerous programs of high potential available. Problem is to supplement Grid or planning courses possibly already attended. Could use some of the personal approach of FEI. Possibility of a Brookings week similar to previous mid-career courses.

7. A few final suggestions:

- a. We might bring in senior officials of certain foreign services for seminars.
- b. We should attempt to utilize the results of historical studies being produced within CIA -- wherever they are evaluative in nature. If not, perhaps the Senior Seminar could add an evaluative note to selected studies.
- c. Inclusion of research papers should be considered. These could be individual or group studies -- for example, a review of the Kirkpatrick 1965 survey of the Agency's future (where were we, where are we now, where are we going?).

HUGH T. CUNNINGHAM
Director of Training

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OTR-5629

26 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : Recommendations Concerning a Seminar for Senior Officers


1. The OTR ad hoc committee -- set up and directed by you to consider the desirability of establishing a training program for senior officers (GS-15/16) -- recommends that priority consideration be given now to its development. There appear to be some compelling reasons at this time why such a step should be taken. Much emphasis has been given to improving and broadening Agency training for junior and mid-career officers -- with the general objective of deepening their understanding of the intelligence profession as it operates in a world of growing complexity. This objective is deserving of at least equal emphasis at the senior officer level. The needs of their own personal development combined with the urgency of maintaining Agency professionalism suggest the existence of a major requirement for such a program. The objectives would be to provide these officers with the opportunity and resources to review the status of the intelligence profession, to comprehend developing trends in the profession about which they may be only dimly aware, and to re-evaluate and sharpen their own skills. An additional objective would be to provide these officers with the most profound judgments available concerning domestic and foreign affairs, the relationships between them, and the potential impact of these events upon intelligence as a major function of government. A complementary objective would be the ultimate establishment of a national intelligence seminar at this senior level -- open to State and DOD -- which would represent an additional means through which CIA could exercise leadership and exert influence in the intelligence community.

2. The following additional considerations underlie our recommendation:

a. There is no appropriate program currently existing which provides senior intelligence officers with an opportunity to review their own profession and to re-evaluate or hone their own professional skills. Many other agencies concerned with National Security affairs have such programs and the Civil Service Commission recently established the Federal Executive Institute to fill this need on behalf of old-line domestic agencies. In CIA the Advanced Intelligence Seminar (average grade about 14) and the COS Seminar represent the nearest approximation to a "senior" course. The COS Seminar is, of

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course, specialized for the CS, and the AIS, while increasingly sophisticated and relevant, does not provide the depth of study visualized for a truly "senior" program (it is particularly limited by the two-week time factor).

b. The non-Agency senior courses to which Agency officers are posted (war colleges, State Senior Seminar, FEI, management programs) do not consider the intelligence profession. (I have attended both NWC and FEI and, therefore, speak from personal experience). They are important as representational assignments, and there is much substance to be gained. But, the war colleges deal with subjects which are essentially familiar to a senior intelligence officer (however new they might be to a pilot or a destroyer captain), and the FEI (a valuable experience) is aimed primarily at personal growth and renewal -- the achievement of managerial balance and health. This is dictated by the enormous variety of agencies represented in a class. FEI simply could not concentrate on the problems of a particular activity within government.

Beyond this, the number of available spaces for CIA officers in the senior schools is not sufficient to provide training for all of those deserving this kind of opportunity. This suggests the existence of a serious long-term gap -- or void -- in the professional development of many of our most promising officers. Many will have had only an orientation program (some have not had that much) and perhaps a special course or two (Grid or Management). This suggests the need for a senior program -- not to replace the others, but rather to provide opportunity for an additional number of officers (50 a year would more than double our current opportunity level).

c. The DIS National Senior Intelligence Course is, in fact, neither national nor senior. CIA has not found it particularly stimulating -- although it does provide our officers who attend with an appreciation of the vastness and complexity of the DOD intelligence effort. It would not represent what one would have in mind for a truly senior course.

d. There continues to be a judgement on the part of some top officials in CIA that parochialism inhibits our activities -- particularly among senior officers. While not a cure-all, a carefully tailored senior program might well contribute to a diminution of this problem.

e. The world -- domestic and foreign -- continues to grow in complexity. The relation between domestic and foreign affairs is inevitably moving closer.

He states that, "more

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discussion, more thought, more analysis, more attention to the problem of understanding the processes of change and their implications for intelligence cannot but be desirable for an Agency whose purpose in being is to tell the US Government not just what has happened and is happening, but what is likely to happen." Mr. [] suggests an OTR seminar on the future. The future -- and the art of futurology -- would obviously be a vital part of the proposed program.

3. Virtually every discussion of this proposal surfaced vigorous opposition -- or presumed opposition. The major factors appear to be the following:

- a. It will be expensive in a time of shrinking budgets -- real estate (1000 N. Glebe Rd. not accepted as "first class") additional personnel, travel money, money for high-class lectures -- are all significant considerations.
- b. It has been proposed before -- or tried before (CS Seminar) -- and has either been shot down or failed. The claim that "the time is now ripe" is old hat. The time is always ripe for whatever one wants to do. The OTR program call has been reflecting lack of requirement for such a program. How do we now rationalize this requirement?
- c. The CS will object, particularly if representatives from other agencies attend. The DDI will perhaps find it hard to accept the existence of such a requirement.
- d. The "work-load" syndrome will be re-stimulated. We have too many people in training now. How can we spare more -- particularly at the level suggested.
- e. This will not fly unless it is a joint program involving the directorates from its very inception. Endorsement by the DCI would be "nice to have," but not necessarily significant in really getting such a program off the ground.

4. For the reasons cited in paragraphs 1 and 2, and in spite of the objections in paragraph 3, we recommend that a target date of fall, 1971, be set for the establishment of a senior seminar on intelligence -- to be of approximately three months duration (this time frame represents a shortening of your initial proposal -- as a compromise with many suggestions we unearthed which suggested a 4-6 week program) -- to be conducted twice yearly -- and to include twenty-five officers per seminar. We also recommend the planning of alternative programs which would allow for the following possibilities: an all-CIA seminar; a seminar including CIA, State, and DOD officers for the entire three-month period; a seminar including CIA, State, and DOD for the first two months, but limited to CIA for the final month.

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5. We recommend that, generally, the following blocs of substance be included (this is highly tentative, probably not all inclusive, and has not been discussed in detail):

a. The US Domestic Scene

In many respects more important for this level officer than for the juniors. Would be aimed not merely at the "concerned citizen," but at the intelligence professional who must now be more attuned to the relation between domestic and "national security" affairs, and sensitive to the points at which they coincide. This section should include not only an analysis of the disruptions and cleavages in US society, but how these factors relate to developments in US foreign policy and to evaluations of the US by other nations. Should include congressional views of foreign policy and impact thereupon, plus views of influential newspapermen and academicians (in addition, how do these people see CIA fitting into US society of the 70s). On the other hand -- a critique of Congress, the fourth estate, and the role of academics would be useful. We might even go so far as to discuss the state of literary and performing arts in the US. (2 weeks)

b. The US and the World

This should include sophisticated discussions of the key geographic areas (with emphasis on varying or conflicting interpretations of developments in those areas) and US relations and problems therein. This would be standard. However, we should add studies of particular and grinding policy problems ("the loss of China" -- "US failures in Latin America" -- "the US as the world's gendarme," etc.) (2 weeks)

c. The National Security Machinery

Briefly -- what is it, but beyond that -- is it creaking? The NSC, the special committees, etc. Proposals for change. (1 week)

d. The Intelligence Community and Its Relation to National Security Machinery

It's hard to see new subjects here, but they would be dealt with, one would hope, in a highly sophisticated and frank atmosphere. USIB and its committees, IIR under Cline, intelligence and military planning, duplication and competition. (1 week)

e. CIA

Its relationship as an agency to White House, to Congress, in US society, and its internal developments, prospects, and

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problems. What is the impact on CIA of the personality of a particular DCI? The question as to how far we go on this would be influenced by whether non-CIA officers will attend. (1 week)

6. Supplementing the blocs of instruction considered in paragraph 5 we would recommend addition of the following (time allotment undetermined):

a. The Impact of Science and Technology

This could involve a broad consideration of the societal consequences of technological developments -- narrowing down to its profound consequences for intelligence. Perhaps a field trip patterned upon the DDS&T training program.

b. Strategic Military Equations

A view (or a series of views) by the "experts" on nuclear relationships and the role of war in modern society. Perhaps a field trip patterned upon Mid-Career course.

c. Management/Planning


We are told that there are numerous programs of high potential available. Problem is to supplement Grid or planning courses possibly already attended. Could use some of the personal approach of FETI. Might even consider some kind of sensitivity or T-group program. Possibility of a Brookings week similar to previous mid-career courses.

7. A few final thoughts emerge:

a. We might bring in senior officials of certain foreign services for seminars.

b. We should attempt to utilize the results of historical studies being produced within CIA -- wherever they are evaluative in nature. If not, perhaps the Senior Seminar could add an evaluative note to selected studies.

c. Inclusion of research papers should be considered -- although we are not recommending at this time.



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Meeting scheduled:

Friday - 23 Oct 70

2:30 p.m.

Col. White's Office

Subj: A Senior School for the
Agency (DD/S 70-3828)

Participants

JWC
Mr. Wattles
Mr. Cunningham

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Colonel White

DD / C O I S T R Y

FILE

Training-3

The attached outline some ideas for an in-house program with the goal of broadening and deepening senior Agency personnel. The first memorandum, from Bob Wattles, suggests a Senior School analogous to FBI. The second memorandum, from Hugh Cunningham, starts with the same premises and suggests the development of a Senior Seminar which might be offered for the first time a year from now.

You may wish to put the subject on a Deputies Meeting agenda for discussion in principle. The idea could be blocked out subsequently by Hugh and staff in greater detail.

SIGNED R. L. Bannerman

R. L. Bannerman
14 OCT 1970

Atts.

STAT SOS/DD/S/ [] bbt (5 Oct 70)

Distribution:

- Orig - Ex Dir-Comp. w/Orig DD/S 70-3828 & 70-4038
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Atts. - DD/S 70-3828 - memo to Ex Dir-Comp. dtd 16 Sept 70 fr D/Pers, subj: A Senior School for the Agency

DD/S 70-4038 - memo to Ex Dir-Comp. dtd 1 Oct 70 fr D/TR, subj: A Senior Seminar on National Intelligence

DD/S 76-3828

16 SEP 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : A Senior School for the Agency

1. This memorandum offers a suggestion for your consideration.
2. The Director has expressed his concern with the development of senior officers with broad multi-Directorate competence. We have been struggling with an Inter-Directorate Rotation Plan. The Office of Personnel has studied the problem of Senior Succession and Succession Development. The Career Training Program starts with an Agency-wide exposure. The Mid-Career Course enrollment is also Agency-wide and, as you know, class after class has remarked on the high value they place on the exposure to people and things outside their own Offices and Directorates. Some of us--certainly not all or I wouldn't be writing this memorandum--hold that there is still too much parochialism in spite of the CTP and Mid-Career approach. I am convinced that much of this comes from senior, but not top, levels.
3. I am under no delusion that what I am about to suggest will correct all ills, but it could be one step nearer. It is possible that the forces of time would bring improvement but it is not probable and even if it were, we can't afford to wait. We need some formal, regular, organized means of raising the level of knowledge, understanding, and appreciation of the work, purpose, and accomplishments of all Agency components by senior employees. A logical move would be a training course at the senior level which continued and complemented the Junior Professional and Mid-Career Courses. On the national level this has been recognized and given substance in the Federal Executive Institute. As a starter, I suggest a four weeks course, out of town, limited to twenty participants, three times a year, supergrades only, under 55. In time, the frequency could be cut back to include only the new 16's for the year. The structuring of the course should be left to the Director of Training. I would see a few lectures by the Director, yourself, and the Deputies, but with most of the emphasis on contributions to the class by the members of the class in various formats.
4. I suggest you discuss with the Deputies and the Director the desirability of establishing a senior training course as one means of improving the preparation of officers for key roles.

/s/ Robert S. Wattles

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

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OD/Pers/RSWattles:pjg (16 Sep 70)

[info 70-4038]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : A Senior Seminar on National Intelligence

REFERENCE : Memo frm D/OP to Ex. Dir. -Compt.,
dtd 16 Sep 70, subj: A Senior School for
the Agency

1. Mr. Wattles's persuasive suggestion closely parallels our thinking in the Office of Training: we have been at work on a proposal much like his for several weeks. An ad hoc committee of the School Chiefs of OTR and others is busy identifying the problems and working up possible solutions, in the hope that the Agency will give sufficient support to the idea for us to be able to offer a genuinely senior seminar of broad scope and duration as early as the autumn of 1971.

2. I had not intended to surface the idea until I could describe it more precisely; for the moment let me say that I think Wattles's memorandum identifies a real and important need. My own proposal will differ somewhat from his. It would lead to the eventual creation of a Senior Seminar on National Intelligence, which while principally devoted to the needs of CIA would also take in senior representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and would come to be the intelligence counterpart of the senior war colleges.


3. Something like this was in the back of my head when, in January 1969 before becoming Director of Training, I showed a list of suggestions to Mr. Bannerman and Mr. Helms. Since then we have moved in the direction of intensified training for mid-level old hands by developing two successful new courses: the Advanced Intelligence Seminar and the Advanced Operations Course. Both courses profit greatly from having the carefully selected students help educate each other. I believe we are now in a position to develop the same approach to substantive in-house training for prospective executives from all over the Agency.

4. Among current reasons for proposing this development are these:

a. OTR has for some time been bothered by the problem you recently raised with respect to the Midcareer Course. Your note of 23 September arrived at a time when we were preparing to recommend that the Midcareer Course be with few exceptions limited to students under forty years of age. More on this soon.

b. This year's nominations for the senior war colleges and other external training brought two growing problems into sharp focus--(1) the Agency is nominating a far larger number of highly qualified officers than can be accommodated and (2) in general, it is nominating older men than those who would probably receive most benefit from the particular external opportunities available. On the first point the Training Selection Board could only regretfully reject many qualified candidates, with the feeling that they nevertheless deserve opportunities for appropriate senior training. On the second, the Board's decision to stick to the age limits set by the schools themselves caused the rejection of a number of otherwise highly qualified applicants on grounds of age alone. More on this soon too.

5. These current concerns, along with the preparation for succession emphasized by Wattles, impel recognition that the Agency needs a new approach to training for carefully selected men and women in their forties who are still growing in their jobs. For such people a good course would be a real opportunity, precisely at the time when their grasp of intelligence problems is most likely to need broadening and deepening beyond their previously parochial experience.


HUGH T. CUNNINGHAM
Director of Training

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